12 Mar 2024

Ben Sira: Where wisdom and law are uncomfortable bedfellows

In the introduction to the book of Ben Sirah, his grandson introduces the work with the purpose that “those who read the scriptures must not only themselves understand them, but also as lovers of learning be able through the spoken and written word to help the outsiders” but also that they themselves “might make even greater progress in living according to the law”.  Equally, in chapter 2, the reverse is also the case whereby “If you desire wisdom, keep the commandments”.  In this view, instruction in wisdom and the living according to the law are complementary rather than contradictory activities, and can in fact create a virtuous circle.  To the extent that wisdom and Torah are separate activities and discourses, they are not necessarily entirely independent ones. 

That one cannot entirely articulate wisdom from the law (or vice versa), a wisdom discourse that can be articulated independently to “help the outsiders” does indicate an accommodation of sorts – a notion we will come back to.  However, it does not the direction of that accommodation, nor that the accommodated discourse is really superfluous other than for rhetorical reasons.  Jack Sanders though would like to argue that the accommodation is one way – that the ancient sapiential traditions needs to accommodate to elements of the Mosaic Torah as a survival strategy, during a period in which the importance of the Pentateuch is growing for the ‘man on the street’.  The appeals to the law are not to be taken at face value and the integration occurs “only in ways that allow the integrity of the sapiential approach to life to continue”.  Where wisdom dictates that one should honour ones parents, this does need the Decalogue to justify it. 

In this sense, would the placing of its wisdom in the context of the ancestors, including Moses to whom G- d gave the commandments, and Aharon from who headed the priesthood be considered just special pleading?  Is its only point acceptance of the “sacred canopy” of ancient wisdom without genuinely placing itself in that tradition?  Wright argues, in contrast, that is precisely the rhetorical point to defend the institution of priesthood against its detractors; albeit that certain groups of priests who may sacrifice without wisdom or are corrupt in other ways.  Though not a work of law, it does take positions on legal matters, such as the use of lunar calendar for setting festivals. The wisdom noted in Ben Sirah is an important correlate to the law, rather than an opponent.  This is not to say there aren’t elements of accommodation, with Wright saying that Hellenistic philosophy is used (in a way the law itself doesn’t internally require) but where it is pressed into service of the issues of the day.  To help the ‘outsiders’ or reinforce the insiders, one may need to steps outside a particular discourse to then reinhabit it.

The law without wisdom may lead to a corrupt priesthood, but wisdom contains its own epistemological limits.  No different that Ecclesiastes and Job, and continuing through to later philosophers in the Jewish tradition like Maimonides; an important part of wisdom is knowing where it ends.  Ben Sirah states that “What is too marvellous for you, do not investigate, and what is too difficult for you, do not research… you have no business with secret things”.  Whether a caution against the wholesale adoption of philosophy, or a broadside against the Enochic tradition that make predictions based on dreams and visions that “have led many astray”, the epistemological point is the same: wisdom does not provide its own foundations.  Whatever the relative importance of law and wisdom – and there will be genuine differences in this regard – they jointly ground one in received (and down to earth) traditions.

It would seem possible to acknowledge different genres of literature, with differing priorities, and different lenses for viewing reality; without setting up ‘opposition’ between them at a global level (albeit there will be differences in particular points).  Historic, legal, narrative and mystic works can operate on different levels of meaning without negating the other.  There can be accommodation between them, where accommodation is not a survival strategy, but an interplay or dialectic of ideas.    


No comments: