Below is essay I wrote as part of my undergrad course in philosophy. It stands up pretty well I think. As usual, I put far too much content in too short a space. There are few things that now I have studied philosophy of language (which I hadn’t at the time) make me cringe a lot. But all in all, I think the author is a pretty smart guy! The reason it is reproduced on this blog is two-fold:
1. As with so many of my essays, I didn’t have a copy of the final version on my computer. It was finished at university, and my university account will have long ago been destroyed. It was lucky I found a single final copy on my email. Having it on blog will help to preserve it.
2. I started to think about the essay again after reading an article in the student journal of Bernard Revel Graduate School of Jewish Studies: Traditions Against Astrology: An Examination of the Curious Role of Tradition in Maimonidean Epistemology by Daniel Loewenstein. It’s a good article but I think he barks up the wrong tree at times, and that the role of tradition is not as curious as he makes out. I remembered I had some relevant info about this towards the end of my essay. I will write about this in my next blog post but wanted my essay online already, so I can reference myself!!!
---------
Did Maimonides believe in the metaphysical doctrine of creation, or was his defence of this doctrine politically motivated?
Introduction
Maimonides, in his philosophical treatise Guide for the Perplexed[1], defends a creation doctrine that states that G-d willed the universe into existence; in opposition to Aristotle’s thesis that the universe is eternal. However, the Guide is a highly esoteric work with Maimonides claiming that certain metaphysical issues must be partly concealed and as such:
“requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in another place necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of another premise contradicting the first one”[2]
Therefore, many scholars have argued about whether he really did believe in the metaphysical doctrine of creation[3] or whether he esoterically believed that the universe was eternal[4]. There has been a separate debate in the literature as to the place of the creation doctrine in Maimonides’ political philosophy. The arguments centre on the pedagogical value of the creation doctrine in upholding or directing Jewish law, beliefs and practice. Both the metaphysical and political arguments about creation are studied independently as whether he believed creation to be true is potentially independent of why he emphasised its importance. However, most scholars work on the dichotomy in the title that either he believed creation to be metaphysically true or he emphasised the doctrine for purely political reasons. It is this dichotomy which will be shown to be false throughout this essay.
The basis for the metaphysical-political dichotomy
The difference between doctrines held for metaphysical reasons and those held for political reasons has as its basis a distinction made in Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic[5] between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy. The former contains geometry, astronomy, the natural sciences and metaphysics whilst the latter includes ethics, economics and politics. According to Maimonides politics is “a science imparting to its masters a knowledge of true happiness, showing them the way to obtain it”[6]. Maimonides taught that the Torah has rendered the ‘nomoi’ of bygone nations superfluous. As such Strauss suggests that “the function of the Torah is emphatically political”[7]. Whilst these ‘nomoi’ deal with the ordering of the city and provisions to obtain what is deemed happiness; the Torah also leads people towards true metaphysical opinions. This is important, as for Maimonides, the ultimate perfection is knowledge of the intelligibles and the demonstrative truths of theoretical philosophy.
“It is clear that to this ultimate perfection there do not belong either actions or moral qualities and that it consists only of opinions toward which speculation has led and that investigation has rendered compulsory”[8].
However, Strauss[9] points out that “the Torah gives only summary indications concerning theoretical subjects, whereas regarding the governance of the city, everything has been dome to make it precise in all its details”. Only a non-political rationality can separate out the true opinions from those that are politically useful. This would suggest firstly that knowledge is reducible to Aristotelian reason and those doctrines in the Torah that are not “true” are merely means to an end. Kreisel[10] denies that this makes political opinions subjective; they are made objective by being the most effective means to an end. However, it is still the case that there is no intrinsic knowledge to be gained from accepting political doctrines.
The dichotomy as evident within the political approach to the creation doctrine
Maimonides’ work can be seen as political in the sense that it reorients Mosaic legislation so that it leads people towards the final end whereby they have knowledge of the necessary truths. An example of this can be shown in Kreisel’s[11] approach to creation whereby it is viewed in terms of its effects in reinforcing the monotheistic idea that “there is a First Existent who gives existence to all existents” and combating idolatry that detracts from this true view. Kreisel points out the discrepancy between the teachings that Maimonides attributes to Abraham between the Mishneh Torah which was written earlier than the Guide. In his Mishneh Torah, Abraham is attributed the proof of G-d’s existence based on the permanence of the spheres, having wondered, “How is it possible for the sphere to be continuously ruled without there being a ruler?”[12] However, Maimonides realised that this approach would lead to the view of the Sabians[13] who all “believed in the eternity of the world, since in their opinion heaven is the deity”[14]. The Sabians reasoned that as the heavens are not subject to coming about or passing away, they must be the dwelling place of G-d and his intermediaries. This served as a justification for their idolatrous practice of worshipping the heavens, which led to the later belief that the spheres were in fact the deity. These considerations can help explain why in the Guide Abraham is attributed with the particularisation argument, which as we will see Maimonides uses to support the doctrine that G-d created the universe. This is because nothing created could be the deity and therefore, is more likely to lead to the true view of G-d. From this example of the political approach we can see that eternity or creation are equally acceptable theories just so long as they lead to the conclusion that G-d is beyond the spheres.
Whilst the above may show the importance of teaching creation to the masses, the Guide is not a rhetorical work directed towards the masses, and therefore cannot explain the arguments in the Guide. Maimonides’ says that it is for a person who “being perfect in his religion and character, and having studies the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify.”[15] Such men live within the bounds of Jewish law and yet are perplexed by apparent contradictions. Their philosophical investigations may lead them to proclaim the truth of the eternity of the universe, which would, according to Maimonides, “destroys the Law in its principle, necessarily gives lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats that the Law has held out”[16]. Such a view would lead people to step outside the bounds of the law and away from ultimate happiness. Strauss notes that “there is a disproportion between the intransigent quest for truth and the requirements of society, or that not all truths are harmless”[17]. In order to retain the benefits of the law whilst retaining one’s philosophical autonomy, people must learn to conceal the rational content of their thought underneath the veil of socially conventional speech. The purpose of the guide, therefore, is to teach the methods of such concealment. After having seen through Maimonides’ esotericism, they must learn to write like that themselves. Just like with Kreisel[18], this allows that a person may proclaim they believe in creation despite actually believing in eternity. “Creation” need only be there to safeguard the law and lead to ultimate happiness.
The thesis of this essay
To the extent that the Torah deals with means to an end, I agree that the Torah is political according to Maimonides’ definition. Also, one cannot ignore the political aspects of the Guide and the creation doctrine, in particular. Maimonides says:
“when there is any division of opinion among the sages which does not affect any rule of practice, but is concerned exclusively with establishing an understanding of a point of doctrine, there is no need to decide in accordance with any one of them”.[19]
Only when a doctrine affects one’s behaviour, such as in the case of the creation doctrine, must an official doctrine be decided upon. Furthermore, this essay will argue that he did not believe creation to be true. However, it will be shown that the dichotomy present in the title is not applicable in the case of Maimonides’ creation doctrine. As such, it will be argued that the creation doctrine is not just political and Maimonides’ did not argue for it merely as a means to an end.
In discussing creation, the most useful distinction Maimonides’ makes is not the one we have already encountered in the Treatise on Logic[20] but one found in his Letter on Astrology where he discusses three different types of knowledge:
“The first is a thing for which there is a clear proof deriving from man’s reasoning […] The second is a thing man perceives through one of his five senses […] The third is a thing that man receives from the prophets or from the righteous”[21]
From this we can see that there other forms of knowledge apart from that which reason can show to be true or false. As such, the creation/eternity issue is not one that can be evaluated in terms of truth and falsity. It will be argued that the creation falls under the third category of opinions received from the righteous where the main form of argumentation is dialectical. Therefore, whilst Maimonides did not believe that creation is literally true, he does not believe that Aristotle’s thesis is either. Instead, ‘creation’ falls under a different category of knowledge.
Metaphysical claims made for creation and eternity in the Guide
My claim would be incorrect if Maimonides did put forward positive claims about creation that are evaluable in terms of their truth and falsity. It seems that this is something he does do as he says, “every existent other than G-d, may He be exalted, was brought into existence by G-d after having been purely and absolutely nonexistent”[22]. Secondly he says that “G-d “was” before He created the world- where the word “was” is indicative of time”[23]. Thirdly, G-d freely willed the universe into being. However, in the course of his discussion all three claims are contradicted and intentionally drained of any force. Many[24] take the first claim to mean that Maimonides is arguing for creation ex nihilo. However, if you consider Maimonides’ language this is not meant as a literal claim as to how the universe was formed. Leaman[25] says that when he uses “min adam” this could either mean G-d created from ‘nothing’ or from ‘matter’; and when being explicit about the creation doctrine he uses ‘la min shay’ (not from something).
In relation to the second claim, he cannot say that there was time before creation given his acceptance of Aristotle’s proposition that time cannot be conceived otherwise than in connection to motion[26]. As Rudavsky says, “time and moving things must be created simultaneously, since neither have any ontological status without the other”[27]. Maimonides readily admits that time belongs to those things created. Therefore, when talking about time before the universe it does not refer to the true reality of time but only something analogous.
Thirdly, what it means for G-d to freely will is left meaningless. Maimonides says that G-d is the intellect, the intellectually cognising object and the intellectually cognised object.[28] They are indistinguishable when the intellect is in action and as G-d “is always an intellect in actu, it follows necessarily that He and the thing apprehended are one thing, which is His essence”[29]. Equally, “that which is never brought into existence is, with reference to His knowledge, an absolutely nonexistent thing”[30]. As such it appears that Maimonides is holding a pantheistic position whereby what exists is part of G-d’s essence and that which does not exist is not possible. As such it does not seem that he is claiming that it is literally true that G-d freely willed the universe into existence.
These contradictions have often led scholars to believe that he agreed with the Aristotelian position that “this being as a whole [the universe], such as it is, has never ceased to be and will never do so”[31]. For example, Rudavsky claims that “an Aristotelian theory of time lends credence to the eternity theory of the universe”[32]. Yet there is much evidence to suggest that this is not the case. Whilst neither motion nor time has ontological status without the other, time “is an accident concomitant with motion, the latter being an accident in that which is moved”[33]. You can only claim that it is necessarily true that the universe has existed eternally if you know it to be necessarily true that motion must exist. As such, “to show the impossibility for the world being having been created in time, not by starting from the nature of being, but by starting from the judgement of the intellect with regard the deity”[34]. Therefore, the battleground between Maimonides and Aristotle is not about ‘time’ but with its corollary; necessity.
Is this not what exactly follow from the arguments in the previous paragraph? Firstly, given Maimonides’ negative theology it would be just as inappropriate to attribute determinism to his essence as it would be to attribute ‘will’. Whilst G-d’s ‘will’ may be used rhetorically to support the law[35], G-d’s determinism is used to show that G-d does nothing that is arbitrary or capricious[36]. Secondly, we can see that he did not think the world was necessary when Maimonides discusses the neo-Aristotelians who hold that G-d willed the universe into existence but did not happen at a particular time[37]. He contends that they abandoned the term “necessary result” but retained the theory of it. Had Maimonides merely wanted to couch the eternity theory in socially acceptable speech he would not have been so vehemently against this. Instead he believes the universe was designed by which “we wish to signify by the term that it- I mean the world- does not necessarily proceed from Him.”[38] Here again we can see there is no literal claim for creation only an argument against necessity.
Maimonides’ arguments for creation
My thesis that neither theory is literally true must be examined within the context of the arguments that Maimonides’ uses for the probability of creation. He uses a two-fold strategy; first, he shows that neither theory is demonstrable and secondly, that there are better reasons for accepting the creation of the world by G-d. The first argument tries to show that you cannot argue from the state of the world as it is now to how it was in production. Maimonides gives the example of a boy who has been brought up by his father on a lonely island and who has never seen a female before[39]. Would this boy be able to believe that a baby could live inside its mother’s tummy without eating through its mouth or breathing their nose? Presumably the boy would not believe this as people die after a very short time being deprived of breath or deprived of food. This reasoning would suggest that babies do not develop in the manner described, but they do! The argument shows that you cannot argue from the state of a fully developed person to how they developed. In the same way we cannot argue from how the world is once created, to how it was in production. Fox[40] explains that inductive arguments are based on analogy; you note that one state of affairs resembles another in a number of ways and conclude that it will also do so in other respects. However, there is no sound analogy that can be drawn to a pre-creation world, as there are no literal claims that we could make about it. As such the current state of the world tells us neither that creation nor eternity are true.
Maimonides then uses his particularity argument[41] to convince us to accept that the world was created. In this argument he wonders why some spheres move from East to West whilst others move in the opposite direction and also why they have different velocities. Also, why is it the case that there is a sphere for each of seven planets but that the upper sphere contains numerous stars? If they are all of a common substance, why are they pre-disposed to assume different forms? He says that these worries are easily alleviated within the theory of creation, as it is a being that wills the direction and velocity of the spheres. He says that Aristotle has tried but failed to give a consistent naturalistic explanation whereby the directions and velocities of the planets follow from the laws of nature. According to him, Aristotle tries to give an explanation in terms of their position in relation to the uppermost sphere. However, in one case a sphere with a higher velocity is above one with a lower velocity; in a second case, the reverse and in a third case, they have equal velocities. It is easy to argue against the specifics of this argument “[b]ecause they are tied to an outdated astronomy, [and as such] the particularity arguments are no longer valid”[42]. Firstly, it is false that the universe is made up of spheres which orbit around the Earth. Secondly, in this era of space travel, we do not face Maimonides’ epistemological difficulties about what space is like. However, according to Goldin, “it is not clear that Maimonides’ argument rests on a confusion between what we cannot know to be the case with what cannot be the case”[43]. Even if everything that happened in the universe was known, we could still ask why it was like that and in virtue of what. Maimonides is saying that, just as there is an explanation for the sublunar sphere, there should be one for the universe as a whole.
The import and effectiveness of Maimonides’ arguments
What is most interesting from our point of view is what import these arguments are supposed to have. What precisely does it mean that neither creation nor eternity are demonstrative? Given that neither are demonstrative, what would further argumentation show about the status of the theories? My argument is that that the fact that neither creation nor eternity are demonstrative theses, indicates to Maimonides that neither are metaphysically true. As such his further arguments are dialectical arguments that tell us which we should accept for reasons, including among others, political ones. However, a more intuitive answer is just that, epistemologically speaking, we cannot know which is true through demonstrative argumentation and that further arguments can tell us which are probably or inductively true. It will be shown that if this second view is taken, Maimonides’ particularity argument has no force.
Maimonides and Aristotle both believe in relation to the spheres that immaterial intellects or unmoved movers are responsible for their movement. As we have seen, Maimonides seems to demand that the spheres and particularly the outermost sphere, which is responsible for the universe as a whole, require an explanation. Does Aristotle believe that there is a similar requirement? In terms of ontology, Aristotle examines what can be said to be and how they relate to each other[44]. Theology, for Aristotle, constitutes determining the role played by immaterial substances and determination that they are intellects. In neither field of study is there room to posit anything responsible for these essences; they are fundamental. For Aristotle, Maimonides’ demand for an explanation is misplaced as they have the features they do, because they have the natures they have. When we see a rabbit we not only say that rabbits are but that there are such things as rabbits. Is this just empty and tautological? Just as the basic kinds that science discovered are posited as first principles, the fact that there are such things as basic kinds is an existence assumption. Therefore, according to Goldwin, “Aristotle himself would have found in Maimonides’ arguments no compelling considerations for admitting temporal creation”[45].
If indeed one theory is true, it has been shown that the particularisation argument has no effect. As there is no reason why it must have an explanation, you would not have to believe that creation is more probably true. However, Maimonides does not deny the fact that these first principles or intelligences must be posited to exist and agrees that they do not compel you to accept creation. The point is that it does not compel you to accept either theory, as neither theory is “true”. As we encountered earlier truth is that to which investigation has rendered compulsory and he also says, “Know that truth refers to the rational virtues of the intellect, since they are the unchanging truths”[46]. Demonstration is not an indicator of truth but is constitutive of it. In other words, something is a truth if and only if it is demonstrative/ necessary. The questions then is “is there a necessary fact that says ‘the universe is eternal’ or ‘the universe was created’?” Maimonides unequivocally answers this by saying that neither theory is demonstrative (given the equivalence between necessity, demonstration and truth). Whilst he believes that the sublunar realm is necessitated by the supra lunar realm, the existence of the supralunar realm is not itself necessary.
Demonstrative and non-demonstrative knowledge within Maimonides’ philosophy of science
The view that a lower realm can be necessary without a higher realm being so can be clarified by looking at his views on astronomy and science. One may call Maimonides a realist about (Aristotelian) science in that everything science declares to exist does really exist. The standard of a true science is that it is demonstrative, not only of the fact that something is as it is but also the reason why. The “why” is to give a cause (in the Aristotelian sense) of why it exists in the way it does. Elements in the sublunar realm conform to this as they exist as in the way they do, due to their position between the encompassing sphere and the centre of the Earth. However, astronomy does not for Maimonides live up to this standard of science. Freudenthal[47] says this is both methodological in that mathematical astronomy does not proceed from facts better known than themselves and substantial, in that it disagrees with Aristotelian science. For example Ptolemy introduced epicycles and eccentrics which conflict with the Aristotelian position that the Earth is at the centre of the universe and the spheres move around it. For example, the eccentric circles do move around a centre but one that is not Earth. However, this does not mean that we should reject astronomy, as among other things their calculations are “not at fault by even a minute”[48]. Instead, Maimonides takes an instrumentalist position where the astronomer’s “purpose is not to tell us in which way the spheres truly are, but to posit an astronomical system […] to correspond to what is apprehended through sight”[49]. As we mentioned in relation to particularity, Maimonides’ argument is to an extent epistemological and Maimonides himself admits there may be an improvement in the science of astronomy. Even so, there would not be causal explanations all the way up and at some point, there will be a mere statement of facts.
Two important points arise from his philosophy of science. Firstly, something is only demonstrative because you can give it a causal explanation and not from the mere fact that it is the way it is. Everything is necessary in relation to the outermost sphere, the Active Intellect, but the outermost sphere itself is left unexplained. Maimonides does not deny that it seems to exist continuously but there is no explanation why it exists continuously. Botwinick says that if you take endlessness seriously:
“one has to envisage the prospect that later entries in the series of statements describing the physical behavio[u]r of the universe will exhibit characteristics and properties that directly contravene those shown by earlier members in the series”[50].
Therefore, that there are a series of facts about the world at the moment does not show that they are necessarily the case. However, if it is not necessarily the case, it need not be eternal! Secondly, the fact that astronomy is not demonstrative is not a reason to reject it and he does not call for it to be reformed. According to Leaman, “[o]n Maimonides’ argument it is a mistake to think of a conflict arising between two competing theories.”[51] Only a demonstrative science can tell you what is necessary and true, but this does not mean other forms of knowledge are not valid. It just means that the knowledge is of a different kind and as such, has a different standard of evidence. For astronomy, the purpose is to make a mathematical system to predict what happens in space and the standard of evidence is whether it matches what is empirically the case. If creation were correct, it would be even more unknowable than astronomy as there is not even a fact in the world that we can empirically verify. However, can this not just be a third competing theory with a different standard of evidence?
Logical and Metaphysical Necessity
As we have seen, Maimonides tries to maintain that the sublunar realm is governed by necessity but the world as a whole is not. However, if we say that G-d ‘freely willed’ the universe into being, is it not possible that G-d could not recreate the universe at each time as in the theory of the Mutakillimun[52]? If this is the case, G-d is the proximal cause of everything and the causal order completely collapses. At this point we need to make a distinction between logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. It is logical necessity, which can either be a priori or a posteriori, that determines what is true. It is the case, a posteriori, that the sublunar realm is logically necessitated given principles known better in themselves, such as the outermost sphere. Maimonides argues against the Mutakillimun as “that which can be imagined is according to them something possible, whether something existent corresponds to it or not”.[53] He argues along Kripkean[54] lines, that whilst it is conceivable that G-d acts as a divine puppeteer, it is not possible. It is this type of necessity which my previous arguments have shown do not apply to the supralunar realm (they are not logically necessitated). However, metaphysical necessity states that the universe is a fundamental fact not in need of explanation. It is absolute necessity which could not have been otherwise. It is this that is possible but which Maimonides argues against with his creation doctrine.
First Principles are never demonstrated
The point that Goldin[55] made that there is no logical reason to compel you to suppose that there needs to be an explanation is correct. However, whilst he saw it as a failure of Maimonides’ particularity argument, it is actually understood and implicit in Maimonides’ assertion that neither theory is demonstrative. There is, as Botwinick says “an underdetermination of theory by fact”[56]. The only way one can avoid an infinite regress of explanation (for any ‘that’ we can always ask another ‘why’) is to embrace circularity and assume the necessity of these first principles. Therefore, according to Maimonides,
Aristotle “thinks [or rather, assumes] furthermore that this whole higher and lower order cannot be corrupted and abolished, that no innovation can take place that is not according to its nature, and that no occurrence that deviates from what is analogous to it can happen in any way”[57]
Given that demonstration is known through principles better known than themselves, the above cannot be a demonstration. Aristotle himself recognises this in his Posterior Analytics[58], where he says that circular demonstration is impossible, as different things cannot be known both prior and posterior to each other. In order that the circularity above is of a less vicious variety, the first principles of any argument must be independent of demonstration. Maimonides employs a similar tactic when he says that the ultimate explanation of the universe is G-d’s will. The literal content of both Aristotle and Maimonides’ theories are the same (i.e. the necessity of the sublunar realm) and is true regardless of whichever metaphysical theory you take to be the case. As such, he cannot suggest that G-d freely willed it unless he already accepts it as a premise. Therefore, both philosophers who assume something in relation to the world as whole can only do so metaphorically. We saw earlier how Maimonides does this in relation to ‘will’, ‘time’ and ‘out of nothing’ but Aristotle does the same with ‘essential nature’.
Dialectical Arguments
The key question then is, which set of premises or first principles should we privilege? Should we assume that the outermost sphere is metaphysically necessary or that it was willed into existence by G-d? As we have seen, this is not a matter of valid reasoning leading to scientific knowledge. Instead, it is of a dialectical, rhetorical or poetical nature which, according to Kraemer, “leads only to consensus, persuasion and evocation”[59]. In Topics[60], Aristotle defines a dialectical problem as an inquiry that can lead either to choice or avoidance or to truth and knowledge. Arsitotle says one would use a dialectical inquiry in regard to issues “to which we have no argument because they are so vast, and we find it difficult to give our reasons, e.g. the question whether the universe is eternal or no”[61]. Equally, a dialectical proposition is a proposition that is accepted by all men, most men or by the most notable of them. One example of a proposition that Aristotle gives that is not demonstrable but that is commonly accepted is that one ought to do good to one’s friends. This fits with Maimonides’ philosophy given the third type of knowledge which we encountered in his Letter on Astrology which was something a “man receives from the prophets or from the righteous.”[62] As such you accepted that ‘the world was created’ as a dialectical proposition deriving from the notable people.
This can help to shed light on what Kreisel[63] said about the political aspects of the creation doctrine. In many ways he is right that the argument used was the one that best to lead people to the demonstrative truth that there is a G-d beyond the spheres and the avoidance of idolatry. However, there are a few points that must be mentioned. Firstly, it is not based on the false assumption that there is the further question “Did he really believe in the eternity theory of the universe?” The whole issue of eternity versus creation is by nature a dialectical argument. Secondly, there is a rational, metaphysical, element in both the accounts given in the Mishneh Torah and Guide that is partly constitutive of the monotheistic idea. Namely, both argue that the spheres are not (logically) necessary hence leading to the speculation that there is a G-d beyond the spheres. This means that not only is there a G-d but the world is not G-d. Thirdly, he is probably right that there is nothing intrinsic to the “creation” doctrine that means we have to accept it over ‘eternity’. Indeed, the fact that you cannot argue from within the world to the world as a whole can be illustrated without creation and is open to all philosophers. However, as we saw at the beginning, this argument does not show its position in the Guide and therefore, does not provide the dialectical argument why we should accept creation. Indeed, it is correct that the Guide allows the ‘perplexed’ to agree with Aristotelian science and yet follow the law. Yet I disagree that someone could believe in eternity as a metaphysical doctrine about the absolute necessity of the universe, whilst professing creation. Instead, creation is a dialectical argument that makes room for both Aristotelian science and the law.
Creation as a dialectical argument showing ‘purpose’ in the world
To see how the dialectical argument proceeds, it is important to note that part of Aristotle’s definition of a cause, and of necessity, is the “final cause”. A material explanation is alone insufficient but must be seen as working for a teleological principle. In On the Heavens Aristotle says, “G-d and nature produce nothing that does not fulfil a purpose.”[64] This is a sentiment that Maimonides shares when he says, “with reference to natural beings, that every one of these has a certain final end, some of them existing for the sake of others”[65]. This necessity or cause is brought about by the spheres, which Aristotle thought were “intelligences”, consciously choosing in accordance with their purpose. The Active Intellect is perfect just thinking about thinking, whilst the other spheres move as they desire to be like it[66]. However, according to Maimonides, “purpose can only be conceived with reference to the production in time of something so produced”[67]. If explanation stops with a fundamental and therefore, inexplicable Active Intellect, we end up with no real explanation at all. Everything is reduced to a mere mechanism deriving from the Active Intellect and as such necessity and chance become indistinguishable. In the language I used earlier, all we can say is that something is the case but not why. As Goodman says, “Causes and effects become mere givens; every event, a pure positivity, with no principle of explanation”[68]. Equally, if the choices of the intelligences derive from absolute necessity they do not even face a modal choice. Nothing is gained by saying they have a choice: they just have to do, what they in fact do, do.
The particularity argument is very much part of this dialectical argument showing that supralunar sphere also has a purpose or final cause. He tries to induce the perspective that the spheres cannot just be explained by trying to approach the outermost sphere or the “perfection”. For if a formulation of their motions could be given in terms of trying to get closer to the Active Intellect, why are some faster than the ones below and on other occasions the opposite? Why do some move to the West and others to East? I will not further explore the argument as Maimonides is involved in dialectic but I am not. It is important to note that whilst Maimonides is giving an argument from design to get us to accept the creation of the universe, he states “I do not deceive myself by designating methods productive of errors as demonstrations”[69]. Instead, unlike the Mutakillimun, he realises that it falls under the auspices of dialectical argumentation. It is therefore better to just accept it as an axiom or first principle. What is it an axiom for?
It allows there to be purpose in the whole universe but one that is not completely knowable through natural science. This opens up the possibility that ‘prophets’ or righteous men could know this purpose. Moreover, it allows a completely naturalistic explanation that Aristotle himself cannot provide. In relation to Moses’ prophecy, he saw all existing things and he “apprehend[ed] their nature and the way they are mutually connected so that he will know how he governs them in general and in detail.”[70] Creation is also an axiom that allows for there to be free will for people to act in accordance with their nature. The spheres do confront real choices but are necessitated because they always act in accordance with their nature. As such, not only is there purpose in nature but also we have real choice to fulfil our purpose or not. This, as we have said, is merely a matter of perspective and does not constitute a theoretical truth. However, according to Leaman:
“the objectivity of the presupposition lies in the relationship between the presupposition and that which it makes possible. As long as we know that the proposition in the presupposition is possible, we are justified in acting upon it”[71]
Conclusion
In this essay, it has been shown that Maimonides did not believe that a metaphysical doctrine of creation was literally true and secondly, it is political in that the doctrine needs to be accepted in order to make the law valid. However, it has been shown that the he did not consider creation as merely a means to an end or that it could be proclaimed whilst believing that the world was eternal. Instead, it is a dialectical argument that is in itself a form of knowledge. Of course, the argument has not actually shown that you should accept creation over eternity. That depends on whether Maimonides’ can successfully explicate how prophets come to know that there is teleology in the world and how this is revealed in the reasons for the commandments. Both of these discussions occur after that of creation in the Guide. However, both the arguments in the Guide and in this essay can be seen as making a space for prophecy. Both in terms of Maimonides’ negative theology and the non-demonstrative nature of the world as a whole “metaphysics recedes on metaphysical grounds to make room for tradition.”[72]
[1] Maimonides (1963 Pines trans). From here on: Guide in the text, GP in the footnotes.
[2] GP, Introduction, p.18
[3] for example, Seeskin (2005)
[4] for example, Rudavsky (2000)
[5] Efros (trans. 1938)
[6] ibid. p.64
[7] Strauss (1973). P.159
[8] GP III:27 p.511
[9] Strauss (1973) p. 157
[10] Kreisel (1999)
[11] Kreisel (1999)
[12] Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatory I:3 as cited in Kreisel (1999), p.42
[13] Maimonides found a book Nabatean Culture which outlined the practices of the Sabians which was the religion of Babylonia which Abraham rebelled against. Maimonides uses them to represent paganism in general. See Pines (1963) p .cxxiii
[14] GP III:29 p. 515
[15] GP Introduction p.5
[16] GP II:25 p.328
[17] Strauss (1963) p. 26
[18] Kreisel (1999)
[19] Sanhedrin 10:3 as cited in Fox (1990), p.45
[20] Efros (1938)
[21] Lerner (1963) as cited in Freudenthal (2005), p.136
[22] GP II:13 p. 281
[23] ibid
[24] Seeskin (2005)
[25] Leaman (1990)
[26] GP. Introduction to II. Proposition 15.
[27] Rudavsky (2000) p.36
[28] GP I:68
[29] GP I:68 p.165
[30] III:20 p. 481
[31]GP II:13 p.284
[32] Rudavsky (2000) p.38
[33] GP II:13 p. 282
[34] GP II:17 p. 298
[35] Botwinick (1997)
[36] Fox (1990)
[37] GP II:21
[38] GP II:21 p.315
[39]GP II:17
[40] Fox (1990)
[41] GP II:19
[42] Seeskin (2000), p.83
[43] Goldin (1992) p.197
[44] information in this paragraph from Goldin (1992)
[45] ibid, p. 202
[46] Eight Chapters: 4 as cited in Kreisel (1999) p. 103
[47] Freudenthal (2003)
[48] GP II:24 p.326
[49] ibid
[50] Botwinick (1997), p.92
[51] Leaman (1990), p. 74
[52] Philosophers such as Al-Ghazali who wrote the book “Incoherence of the Philosophers” in order to refute philosophy and defend religion. See Pines (1963) page cxxiv
[53] GP I:73 p.207
[54] Kripke (1981)
[55] Goldin (1992)
[56] Botwinick (1997), p.90
[57]GP II:13 p.284
[58] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics (1941 trans, 2001 ed.), I:3
[59] Kraemer (2000), p.117
[60] Aristotle, Topics, (1941 trans, 2001 ed.)
[61] ibid. I:11 p.197
[62] Lerner (1963) as cited in Freudenthal (2005), p.136
[63] Kreisel (1999)
[64] as cited in Altmann (2000), p.6
[65]GP III:13 p.449
[66] Aristotle, Metaphysics. (1941 trans, 2001 ed.), XII:9
[67] ibid
[68] Goodman (2000), p.70
[69]GP II:16 p.293
[70] GP I:54 p.124
[71] Leaman (1990), p.81
[72] Botwinick (1997) p.44
