Wittgenstein, Bridge and Sport

There is a Judicial Review underway around whether Bridge should be classified as a sport or not.

My initial thought – as I’m sure would be the initial thought of anyone reading the article – is what would Wittgenstein say?

Sport England, taking its lead from the Council of Europe, defines a sport as an "activity aimed at improving physical fitness and well-being, forming social relations and gaining results in competition".

The later Wittgenstein wouldn’t countenance that any definition or analysis of the word “sport” (indeed, any word, meaning or function) that would act as a ‘rule’ that would satisfactorily cover all eventualities – classifying an activity in or out. 

Even if such rules were theoretically possible (which they aren’t), an ‘imposed’ definition such as the one from Sports England would not do justice in many cases as to how we actually use the term – what we do or do not in fact use “sport” in relation to. 

It makes sense to call Snooker a sport, but am not sure how much it is “aimed at improving physical fitness” or successful at doing so, in comparison to SAS training, which would not generally be thought of a sport

There is no “right” answer but nonetheless how we use the term (according to Wittgenstein) forms a ‘grammar’ of the term.  The grammar does firstly, mean that someone would look at you weirdly if you said “Pencil is a sport” – you would know that they cannot mean the same thing as you or that they are talking nonsense.  Secondly, it establishes some things as more representative of “sport” with others bearing more or less family resemblance to it.  Third, it will establish associations and disassociations with other concepts such as “hobby”, “leisure activity” and “game” 

Sports England argue: 

It has argued that bridge is no more of a sporting activity than "sitting at home, reading a book".

First thing, why couldn’t reading a book at home be a sport?  One could certainly come up with a scenario (e.g. multiple people reading the same book as fast as they can against the clock, and then answering 20 questions about it) where it might more plausibly thought of as so.

As such, Wittgenstein says there is no reason why one couldn’t call Book-Reading a sport.  Yet, they are probably right that the family resemblance is more like a second cousin-twice removed than an identical twin. Comparing bridge to book reading is a good rhetorical point, therefore, but probably a disservice (Bridge does at least have competition, for example)

My thoughts, in brief, then are:

1. If you were going to call Bridge a sport, first you would have to admit that it is not an archetypal sport; and second, go on to explain its family resemblance
2. Ultimately, if you were discussing it in the pub, people would “know what you mean” but someone else might be “you must be kidding, mate”.  Ultimately though, it’s six of one and half a dozen of the other
3. Bridge players are therefore entitled to call it a sport but not sure they can simply do so because they want some funding from Sport England if they didn’t already.
4. Judges are entitled to decide whether there is any legal reason why it is somehow wrong to deny them funding (but seems dubious if on the basis that they are the right people to “define” the word(even if that were possible)
5. Sports England are too entitled to define who gets funding based on their mission and mandate, however defined, and this can well exclude bridge.  This though would not seem to depend on the meaning of a word.

If you were to press me though, Bridge isn’t a sport

Confronted Man - Tragic Philosophy: Part 1

I fear that philosophy- taken to its proper conclusions- is a necessarily tragic ethic that rightly belongs with the rest of Greek culture.  It starts with the individual self who doubts and questions; and ends, at best, with knowledge and facts.  If a man confronts the world as something-to-be-known, he is making it into something of an entirely different order than himself:  The subjective will of man over and against the objective and lifeless order of the world.

As R’ Soloveitchik says:

Even the most abandoned voluptuary becomes disillusioned like the king of Ecclesiastes and finds himself encountering something wholly other than his own self, an outside that defies and challenges him…  He discovers an awesome and mysterious domain of things and events which is independent of and disobedient to him

Why should we be disillusioned?  Surely, man can end up as much with victory, as defeat.  He can end up conquering the world with his superior intellect and knowing everything there is to be known.  Quite so, but as Wittgenstein states, “We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered [and thus know all true facts about the world], the problems of life remain completely untouched.  Of course there are no questions left…” 

What the person really wants to find is precisely what he can’t; there are no more questions to ask and reality has no more to yield.  In fact, it is precisely this cognition that brings into sharp relief our inability to find meaning in the world: “The facts all contribute to setting the problem, not to its solution” (Wittgenstein).  The absurdity of existence lies in us witnessing fact after random fact without being able to give answer to the question of “Why?”  Facts are clearly stated but it is the lack of a language- our lack of grip- on questions of meaning that lead us to the philosophical conundrum that Albert Camus once pondered.

There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy

This then is philosophy; by standing external to all events and things as the impartial judge, you will only ever become acquainted with things (like scientific facts) that can be known externally and impartially.  You will never be able to reach out to that which is beyond your intellectual grasp.  You will never become acquainted with the interiority of the other.  The intimate- knowing- relationship with the world, other people and G-d that fill life with meaning will be missing.

This can be seen most forcefully with Maimonides whose highest goal was to know G-d and yet where this was the one thing (necessarily, according to his philosophy) that completely evaded him.  To know something was for it to be demonstratively true; where impartial logic would demand it be so.  Here, Aristotle was King knowing every true statement under the sun.  What Aristotle missed, however, was that you can know all this and it not bear on the most important problem of life.  To declare anything in the world as G-d would be to cheapen the concept and yet, that is all we can know in a demonstrative fashion.  Moses, according to Maimonides, achieved his perfection by knowing the whole world and knowing that it was not G-d.  Thus, the highest level of man consists of being aware that there is nothing he can know of G-d, nothing he can say about Him and continually being reminded of the distance between them. 

This realisation could lead to breakdown:

Man may despair, succumb to the overpowering pressure of the objective outside and end in mute resignation, failing to discharge his duty as an intellectual being, and thus dissolving an intelligent existence into an absurd nightmare. (Soloveitchik)

Yet, the alternative route of carrying out your intellectual duty is, as we have seen, no less tragic.  One is left, as Wittgenstein points out, at a place where solipsism, idealism and realism meet.  Solipsism, because “The world is my world” where yours is the only subjective self that you meet.  Idealism, because only what is possible to be ‘thought’ can be the case, and G-d and ethics are outside that.  Realism, because “The world is all that is the case” independent of my will.  Here the philosopher left with a lonely, detached individual facing a cold, hard, objective world.

Maimonides, Soloveitchik and Wittgenstein all bide us to fulfil our duty as intellectual beings and advance in the scientific world.  Yet, solving these problems “shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved”.  How can a philosophical ethic be achieved on this basis?  How can we go on without knowing the interiority of the other?  Why not just commit suicide?

Creationism, Cucumbers and Chairs

A few thoughts on creationism inspired by Wittgenstein's philosophy

I

Creationist Jews say that “G-d planted the fossils” and so really the world is only 5769 years old. They were put there as a test to see whether we would believe in the Torah’s account of creation. Religious Jews who believe in evolution will often give the feeble reply that “I don’t believe in a G-d who would deceive us”. Why, so the thought goes, would G-d give us such detailed and reliable evidence about the natural history of the world if it was false? He would be intentionally leading us the garden path and reneging on his promise that we can know him through studying creation.

Now, I have no business second-guessing G-d. “I don’t believe in a G-d who would prefer 20-20 cricket over test match cricket” but he might. I’m not sure how ascribing psychological motivations to G-d can lead us to have an opinion about the age of the world. Would he test us? Would he deceive us? G-d knows!

Let’s not say he wouldn’t deceive us. Instead, let us say that there is no such thing as deceiving us in this case.

Let’s not say that they are saying something false. Let us say, that they are saying nothing.

II

Consider chairs- and cucumbers. If I point to a chair and say “This is a cucumber”, it is clear that it is not a true assertion. But is it an assertion at all? Am I really making a claim about the object I am pointing to? What am I saying about it?

Let us say that a red-green colour blind man is a long way away from a red chair and has forgotten his glasses. Let us say that he is seeing its profile and is partially obscured and so can only see one of the prongs on the back of the chair. Let us say that next to the chair is a prize-winning, enormous tomato. If I then pointed to the chair and asked him what the object was, he might say “It a long, thin green thing that is part of a fruit collection- must be a cucumber”. This is a false assertion but an assertion nonetheless.

How about he situation where a normal sighted man is standing right by the chair and says “This is a cucumber”? I tell him that it is surely a chair. He replies:

It looks like a chair. It feels like a chair. It has the function of a chair. We bought it from a chair shop and we were told by the shop assistant that it was a chair. The label on the barcode says ‘chair’. But really it is a cucumber.

‘Really it’s a cucumber?’

Yes, the cucumber is disguised as a chair. It’s appearance, role and function are deceptive and hide its essence. I am most upset that the judges of the cucumber competition wouldn’t let me enter it. I can at least console myself that I am more in tune with reality than them.

How would we react to such a man? It surely wouldn’t be correct, unlike with the colour blind man, to try and prove him wrong. I could bring the colour-blind man closer to the chair, fetch his glasses, gather other people’s opinions and show him the chair in a fruit-free setting. But what of the second man? His perceptive organs are fully functioning and has been appraised of all the relevant definitions and facts. Any evidence you show him he can take in his stride. “Yes, it is indicative of it being a chair, something with those features is usually a chair, it would logically be a chair; BUT in this case it is not one.” As there is no pretence to the ‘claim’ being based on criteria, you cannot show the claim to be false by comparing it to any.

How then should we relate to the utterance? Well, I suppose it depends on the context. Maybe it is a joke (“freaked you out there mate”). Maybe it is art (“I’m trying to get you to consider things from another perspective, man”). Maybe it is an assertion of authority (“I can say what the hell I want. If I say a chair is a cucumber, you must agree”). Maybe it is part of nonsense poetry or prose (“I’m the new Lewis Carroll”). Or maybe it is just madness or mental illness (“I am the Sith Lord, King of Hooplah”).

Whatever it is- good or bad- they are not asserting a fact. It sounds like an assertion. In certain situations (like the one I contrived above) those very same words could be an assertion. But to point to a nearby chair and say “this is a cucumber”, is not to say anything about the object- true or false.

III

Now transpose this to the creation case. We are fooled into trying to argue against “The world is 5769 years old” because it sounds like a bona fide assertion about the age of the world. In the past, in the mouths of scientists, religious leaders and laymen alike, it could be such an assertion- albeit one that turned out to be false. This could also be the case -in certain circumstances- today. If someone is brought up in complete ignorance to the fossil record, he may be able to make that claim. Maybe a child can make the claim. But what of someone who is aware of the fossils and says that G-d planted them? This isn’t false- it’s nonsense. The same words are used- but they don’t have the same meaning.

If you bulk against this, just consider your reaction to someone who said “G-d created the world for the first time five minutes ago”. You might initially take this seriously and 1. tell them of your memories from 10 minutes ago 2. CCTV footage of what you did yesterday 3. testimony from your friends that you grew up together etc etc etc. But then this person insists that G-d planted these memories and the CCTV footage and all the other evidence. These memories are not “real”- only the last five minutes are “real”.

Your reaction wouldn’t be to continue to prove him wrong, would it? Much less would it be to say “G-d wouldn’t do that- he wouldn’t deceive us” or engage in theological psychology. Instead, you’d say “You what?” or “Stop kidding around” or “What you up to?” or “you need a good lie down” or “okaaayyyy…” or “whatever you say mate, let’s go down to starbucks” or “Idiot” or “Who you been speaking to?” or just give a comforting tap on the shoulder.

The reason for any of those reactions is that you are trying to figure out what the person is doing with those words. What function are they performing? One thing you are damn sure about is that they can’t – just can’t- be to say something true or false about the world- describing a state of affairs. It is just too wacky for that. The last resort is to say that they are not using them for any rational function and is clinically mad- there maybe a psychological function for the utterance.

So too with the world being 5769 years old. Jewish creationist are not mad and say it for a rational and admirable (although not conscious) reason. Once freed of philosophical and ethical irrelevance of evolution, they can start to think about what the Torah is trying to teach us with the creation story. Ignore the “Just-So” stories that evolution sometimes dreams up (especially in areas like psychology) and instead analyse the commentaries for the theological, ethical and philosophical lessons, just as we have always done.

However, don’t mistake an admirable reason for a real claim about the age of the world. You can physically observe from different geological strata that the age of world is older than that. There is no need for any detailed scientific training. It’s obvious. Standing in front of that and claiming a “new earth” is like standing in front of the chair and saying it’s a cucumber.

An honest religious thinker...

I

Once more, there is a beautiful quote from Wittgenstein that perfectly summarises the status of religion today:

An honest religious thinker is like a tightrope walker. He almost looks as though he were walking on nothing but air. His support is the slenderest imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk on it.

The intellectual conditions, as such, for religious belief have never changed. Only the social conditions have. Ultimately religion isn't based on evidence for the probability that it is true. In fact, it is of the very essence that it is not. The question as to whether we accept the 'yoke of heaven' or not is firmly on our shoulders. Of course, I'm not saying the choice is arbitrary; 'How we act' very much depends on what how we take the world to be. However, Judaism stresses the 'limits of reason' and no reason will force us one way or the other. Ultimately one has to make a decision- do I see the world like this or like that?

This is precisely the Jewish concept of free-will. Reason cannot intellectually arbitrate between what Christian/secular culture denotes by 'theism' and 'atheism' (No religious Jew could be an atheist or a theist). Thus, one can't adequately conclude such a discussion before deciding how to act. The 'yetzer hara' (evil inclination) can always reinterpret the facts to justify what it wants without being irrational. I won't believe I have to do x, y or z, unless I have an 'ultimate reason', a 'proof' that I have to.

Rationality, so religion tells us, doesn't go 'all the way down'. What I mean by this can be illustrated by the following:

[A scientist gave a lecture about astronomy]. At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise." The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever, young man, very clever," said the old lady. "But it's turtles all the way down!"

What's supports the world? A turtle. What supports the turtle? Another turtle. What supports that?... and so on. Ultimately, you can (and should) give reasons for what you believe. Religion is not for the intellectually frail. However, on the one hand, there is no bottom turtle- one which you cannot ask what supports it. In philosophical parlance, there is no indubitable belief that lies at the bottom of our knowledge claims. There is no 'basic belief' from which you can argue outwards from, or inwards to. On the other hand, our finite minds can't intellectually settle for for infinite turtleness! We cannot justify our claims by a premise that lies infinitely far away.

So what to do? Ultimately, we have to rely on practical rationality. Whilst we can be intellectually agnostic, in practice we have to live a secular life or a religious one. The choice is not one between atheism and theism (the search for the bottom turtle) but between being an Ish ha-Elokim (man of G-d) or an Apikorus (one who mocks the sages). Through the actions we choose we are committing to interpreting the world as an expression of divine creation or as mechanical entity without moral consequence. Either we see the Mesora (Jewish tradition) as divine order or a human creation.

II

As I say, this has always been the way. So why does it now appear that we are "walking on nothing but air"? There are two reasons. Firstly, people in bygone eras (practically) related to the world as if it were enchanted. This was one in which the world was controlled by powers that lay outside of our understanding. The world- so to speak- had a personality. From a Jewish perspective, this isn't unanimously seen as positive. It was such a view that led to the prevalence of avodah zara (untranslatable! strange worship). People who couldn't understand why the sun did what it did began to attribute it as an independent power (a god). Whether we should, in a limited way, believe in an enchanted world depends on which view of Judaism you take (Rambam/ Malbim vs. Ramban/ HaLevi) and both have merits.

Nevertheless, when holding such a view, it is obvious to believe in the supernatural. It is natural and woven into the very fabric of your being. In a post Cartesian and Newtonian world, this is no longer so. The major change was not theoretical per se- both Descartes, Newton and many after them were firm believers in G-d. Instead, they affected a change in the very way we see the world. Everything is there to be intellectually conquered, brought into our understanding, control and subdued. We are suddenly in a world where something beyond our grasp becomes instinctively alien. With such a mindset one can passionately believe in G-d but it's a decision that is against the grain. One always had to make a decision but its now more like a leap

I suppose a simpler way of putting that (although it misses some of the subtleties) is that it is very counter-cultural to believe in G-d so seems to require more justification. Yet as I said above, there is nothing one can point to that 'settles the matter' that would compel you to accept it (esp. if you were looking for ways not to believe). Hence tightrope.

III

The second reason is that- as Jews- we no longer live in self-governing communities governed by halacha. We now seem to require a justification for the institution itself. Previously the keeping of halacha, in the public realm at least, was de facto- it just was what happened. It was the base or practical starting point from which all decisions or philosophizing began.

Even from such a social position there is a role for the free intellectual and moral decisions laid out above. First of all, there was taking upon oneself all the obligations that were not of specific concern to the public order. It is unlikely that in times past, many people were shomer mitzvot (kept the commandments) in the way explicated by the rabbis in their academies. However, let's assume by habit or instruction they did. We are taught that free will isn't only about the keeping of commandments, but performing them with kavanna (the right intention). This directly depends on how we take the halacha- divine order or human creation? One may keep it out of habit or only keeping it where one has to avoid the wrath of the authorities (Beth Din). On the other hand, one perform an action with the awareness that it is is mitzvah from G-d. However, no intellectual premise could lead one to this awareness.

So what is the difference today when Jews are growing up secular? Again, we could just highlight the obvious practical consideration that a) it seems a bigger leap to decide to keep halacha in the first place than to do what you already do with more kavannah b) to decide to keep halacha is harder when it is counter-cultural and c) whilst no-one in the past would have doubted that halacha should govern society, one now is asked for justification.

However, this might be misleading. It is not that they didn't realise the 'tightrope' nature of the justifications for halachic practice because they happened not to ask! Instead, to a certain extent it was unnecessary to do so! The whole life of the community was built around the rhythm and pulse of the religious life. One could see a practical manifestation of G-d's will in the world. One could be inspired by tzadikim- living Torah scrolls. And so on. Of course, one could use free will to see things in a different way but there was a living testament to the fact that we are a 'wise and understanding people'. Nowadays, without being born inside such a society, we can only look at it externally. From the outside, without the testament, why halacha?

IV

But, as Wittgenstein says, despite the fact that "His support is the slenderest imaginable.... it really is possible to walk on it" The reason being that in Wittgenstein's words "explanation comes to an end" and our beliefs ultimately rest on a "form of life". From the outside- from the perspective of philosophy- the ground is continually slipping from under our feet. That is, no honest religious thinker can believe in religious dogma. We can't believe that there is a statement that is philosophically indubitable and not open to challenge.

Thank G-d then that our feet do not rest on such a slender base but one that is the broadest imaginable. We stand on a base of action- on a form of life- which provide a context in which our beliefs make sense. Within a halachic lifestyle a Jewish orientation is revealed throughout every aspect of our life. Our actions are in a sense, revelatory of our beliefs.

This doesn't mean we can point to our actions as a justification our belief. From the outside, as I have said, we can only be intellectually agnostic. How then, in the modern world where we are conditioned to see everything from the outside, should we make such a decision? I don't know. Yet I am sure that I can see the world as divine without breaking my neck.